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The Big Man in the Big House: Prisoner Free Exercise 
in Light of Employment Division v. Smith 
INTRODUCTION: FIRST AMENDMENT FREE-EXERCISE CLAIMS ON 
THE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE  
Shocking as it might seem, prisoners possess more free- 
exercise protections than private citizens.1 As proof of this 
proposition, consider the following hypothetical. A Rastafarian 
man is arrested for smoking marijuana. Outraged, he files a First 
Amendment claim alleging that the state’s categorical ban on 
marijuana use violates his right to religious free exercise.2 While 
his claim is pending, another man—a Rastafarian prisoner—brings 
a First Amendment free-exercise suit challenging a similar prison 
ban on marijuana use. When presented with the private citizen’s 
free-exercise claim, the judge applies the rule set forth in 
Employment Division v. Smith and immediately dismisses the 
claim.3 When evaluating the prisoner’s free-exercise claim, 
however, the judge applies the rule set out in Turner v. Safley and 
only dismisses the claim after conducting a more intensive judicial 
analysis.4 While the judge’s rulings on both claims were the same, 
the methods by which the judge adjudicated the claims were not.  
Currently, prisoner and nonprisoner free-exercise claims are 
evaluated under different standards of review, and the standard 
applied to prisoner claims appears to embody a stricter form of 
judicial scrutiny than the standard applied to nonprisoner claims.5 
Outside the prison context, First Amendment free-exercise claims 
are subject to the rule set forth in Smith.6 Under Smith, a 
constitutional violation does not exist if an alleged burden on 
religious free exercise is the result of a neutral law of general 
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 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See generally Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 4. See generally 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 5. See discussion infra Parts I–II. 
 6. Michael Keegan, The Supreme Court’s Prisoner Dilemma: How 
Johnson, RLUIPA, and Cutter Re-Defined Inmate Constitutional Claims, 86 
NEB. L. REV. 279, 281 (2007) (“[In] Employment Division v. Smith . . . the Court 
abandoned strict scrutiny for non-inmate free exercise claims (i.e., cases outside 
the prison context) in favor of a deferential facial review.” (citations omitted)). 
See also Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978, 2995 n.27 
(2010) (applying Smith to a state university’s neutral and generally applicable 
policy). 
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applicability.7 Therefore, under Smith, the judge in the above 
hypothetical was able to dismiss summarily the nonprisoner’s 
claim because any alleged free-exercise violation was the result of 
a neutral and generally applicable law banning all marijuana use. 
Prisoner free-exercise claims, on the other hand, are subject to the 
rule set out in Turner.8 Under Turner, a prison regulation is 
unconstitutional if it is not “reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests.”9 To determine the reasonableness of a 
prison regulation, a court must balance four factors—factors that 
are not addressed under the bright-line rule set forth in Smith.10 
Turner thus appears to require a judge to examine free-exercise 
claims with greater scrutiny than Smith requires. Surely, there must 
be some justification for this seemingly backward state of affairs. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case. 
This Comment posits that no valid justification exists for the 
continued use of Turner in prisoner free-exercise cases. Turner 
creates a conundrum whereby courts apply a higher level of 
scrutiny to prisoner free-exercise claims than to nonprisoner free-
exercise claims. In effect, the continued application of Turner 
provides comparatively greater protection to prisoner free-exercise 
rights. Such a result lacks precedential support and is antithetical to 
the well-established constitutional principles underlying the Turner 
standard. Instead of applying Turner, courts should apply Smith to 
all First Amendment free-exercise claims regardless of their 
origins.  
In reaching this conclusion, Part I of this Comment presents the 
development of the Turner and Smith standards. Part II 
demonstrates how Turner embodies a higher level of scrutiny than 
Smith. Part III then argues that Turner’s continued application to 
prisoner free-exercise claims is contrary to Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, as well as the foundational principles of the Turner 
standard. Part IV presents the circuit courts’ primary justifications 
                                                                                                             
 7. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878 (“[I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . 
is not the object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect of a generally 
applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been 
offended.”); see also Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 490 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(Nelson, J., dissenting). 
 8. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349–50 (1987). 
 9. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).  
 10. The four Turner factors include: (1) whether there was a “valid, rational 
connection” between the prison regulation and the government interest 
justifying it; (2) whether there was an alternative means available to the prison 
inmates to exercise the right at issue; (3) “the impact [that] accommodation of 
the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on 
the allocation of prison resources generally;” and (4) the existence of ready 
alternatives to the challenged regulation. Id. at 89–91.  
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for Turner’s continued viability and explains why these 
justifications are unpersuasive. Finally, Part V of this Comment 
illustrates how Smith is equally capable of protecting prisoner, as 
well as nonprisoner, free-exercise rights. As a result, this Comment 
concludes that Smith should be the standard of review for both 
prisoner and nonprisoner free-exercise claims.  
I. RECENT HISTORY OF FREE EXERCISE: PRISONER AND 
NONPRISONER STANDARDS OF REVIEW  
The First Amendment protects the free exercise of religion 
by guaranteeing that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof 
. . . .”11 Interpretations of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
Clause have changed significantly over the past forty-plus years.12 
In particular, the United States Supreme Court has struggled to 
determine which standard of review should govern free-exercise 
cases.13 Between 1963 and 1990, the Court made two notable shifts 
in the free-exercise standard of review.14 One shift involved 
prisoner free-exercise cases, while the other involved free-exercise 
cases generally.15  
A. Strict Scrutiny of the Sherbert Analysis  
The recent history of free-exercise jurisprudence began in 1963 
with Sherbert v. Verner.16 In Sherbert, the United States Supreme 
Court addressed the constitutionality of a South Carolina 
unemployment compensation law.17 The South Carolina statute 
prevented a Seventh-day Adventist from receiving unemployment 
payments because she was unwilling to work on Saturday, her 
                                                                                                             
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 12. See generally Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, The Genesis of RLUIPA 
and Federalism: Evaluating the Creation of a Federal Statutory Right and Its 
Impact on Local Government, 40 URB. LAW. 195, 196–208 (2008) (illustrating 
the changes in constitutional and statutory free-exercise standards from 1963 
onward).  
 13. Id. See also James D. Nelson, Incarceration, Accommodation, and Strict 
Scrutiny, 95 VA. L. REV. 2053, 2057–59 (2009) (explaining the multiple shifts in 
standards of review in free-exercise cases). 
 14. See Nelson, supra note 13, at 2057–59; see also discussion infra Parts 
I.B–C.  
 15. See Nelson, supra note 13, at 2057–59; see also discussion infra Parts 
I.B–C. 
 16. 374 U.S. 389 (1963); see also Nelson, supra note 13, at 2057. 
 17. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399–401. 
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religion’s Sabbath Day.18 The Sherbert Court applied a strict 
scrutiny standard that required the state to prove that a “compelling 
state interest” justified the burden on the free exercise of religion 
that the unemployment compensation law created.19 South 
Carolina failed to meet this demanding standard and thus the Court 
found the unemployment compensation law unconstitutional.20 For 
nearly three decades, Sherbert remained the primary standard of 
review for free-exercise claims involving private citizens.21 
Twenty-four years after the Sherbert decision, however, the Court 
began evaluating prisoner free-exercise claims under a more 
deferential standard. 
B. Prisoner Free Exercise 
As a result of two 1987 United States Supreme Court 
decisions, Turner v. Safley and O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, lower 
courts began applying a deferential “reasonableness” test, not strict 
scrutiny, to prisoner free-exercise claims.22 Quite simply, the Court 
found strict scrutiny unworkable in the prison setting.23 In Turner 
and O’Lone, the Court provided numerous justifications for this 
new standard. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 18. Id. at 399. 
 19. See id. at 406. The Court further reasoned that “[i]t is basic that no 
showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would 
suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, ‘[o]nly the gravest abuses, 
endangering paramount interest, give occasion for permissible limitation.’” Id. at 
406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). The Court 
eventually began to interpret the Sherbert “compelling state interest” test as 
possessing a “least restrictive means” element whereby “[t]he state may justify 
an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of 
achieving some compelling state interest.” Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 
707, 718 (1981). However, the Thomas v. Review Board Court qualified this 
statement by declaring, “[I]t is still true that ‘[t]he essence of all that has been 
said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order . . . 
can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.’” Id. at 718 
(quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)). Subsequent courts 
have referred to the Sherbert test as the “compelling government interest” test. 
See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
883–84 (1990). As such, this Comment refers to the Sherbert test under both 
names.  
 20. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407–09. 
 21. See 63 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 2 (2001).  
 22. See Nelson, supra note 13, at 2057–59. 
 23. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 
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1. Turner v. Safley and the “Reasonableness” Test 
Surprisingly, the catalyst for change in the prisoner free-
exercise standard, Turner v. Safley, was not a free-exercise case.24 
In Turner, the Court addressed the constitutionality of two 
regulations promulgated by the Missouri Division of Corrections.25 
The first regulation permitted communication between inmates at 
different institutions only if the inmates were immediate family 
members or if the communication involved a legal matter.26 The 
second regulation forbade inmates from marrying without 
supervisor approval, which normally required an inmate to produce 
compelling reasons supporting the marriage, such as pregnancy or 
the birth of a child.27 The Supreme Court overruled the Eighth 
Circuit by refusing to apply strict scrutiny to the challenged 
regulations.28 Instead, the Turner Court sought to establish a more 
deferential standard of review that would apply to all constitutional 
claims brought by prisoners.29  
The Court based its standard of review on two overarching 
principles gleaned from prior prisoner rights cases.30 First, the 
Court established that “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier 
separating prison inmates from the protections of the 
Constitution,” and, therefore, courts must be cognizant of 
constitutional claims brought by prisoners.31 Second, however, the 
Court also recognized that running a prison requires tremendous 
expertise, and “‘courts are ill equipped to deal with the 
increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and 
reform.’”32 The Court created the following standard to reconcile 
the need to provide redress for prisoners’ constitutional grievances 
with the need for judicial restraint: “[W]hen a prison regulation 
impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if 
it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”33  
To determine whether a challenged regulation is reasonably 
related to a legitimate penological interest, the Court developed a 
four-part balancing test.34 The four factors include: (1) whether there 
                                                                                                             
 24. See Keegan, supra note 6, at 283.  
 25. Id.; Turner, 482 U.S. at 81. 
 26. Turner, 482 U.S. at 82. See also Keegan, supra note 6, at 283. 
 27. See Keegan, supra note 6, at 283; Turner, 482 U.S. at 81–82. 
 28. Turner, 482 U.S. at 81. 
 29. Id. at 85. 
 30. See id. at 84–85. 
 31. Id. at 84. 
 32. Id. at 84–85 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974)). 
 33. Id. at 89. 
 34. Id. at 89–91. 
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was a “valid, rational connection” between the prison regulation and 
the government interest justifying it;35 (2) whether there was an 
alternative means available to the prison inmates to exercise the 
right at issue;36 (3) “the impact [that] accommodation of the asserted 
constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on 
the allocation of prison resources generally;”37 and (4) the existence 
of ready alternatives to the challenged regulation.38 Applying these 
factors, the Turner Court upheld the communication ban but 
invalidated the marriage regulation.39 Within days of Turner, the 
Court would apply this “reasonableness” test to prisoner free-
exercise claims in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz.40 
                                                                                                             
 35. Id. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)). The 
Turner Court elaborated further on this factor by declaring that “a regulation 
cannot be sustained where the logical connection between the regulation and the 
asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.” Id. at 
89–90. Furthermore, the Court noted that “the governmental objective must be a 
legitimate and neutral one.” Id. 
 36. Id. at 90. The Court noted that the amount of judicial deference shown 
to prison officials is affected by the existence of alternative means of exercising 
the right in question. See id. 
 37. Id. The Court continued: “When accommodation of an asserted right 
will have a significant ‘ripple effect’ on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts 
should be particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections 
officials.” Id. 
 38. Id. at 90–91. The Court noted that “the existence of obvious, easy 
alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an 
‘exaggerated response’ to prison concerns.” Id. The Court further noted that this 
test is not a “least restrictive alternative” test. However, “if an inmate claimant 
can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de 
minimis cost to valid penological interests, a court may consider that as evidence 
that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.” Id. 
 39. Id. at 91–100. Prison officials cited security concerns as the basis for 
their communication ban. According to the Court, communication between 
inmates could be used as a means of planning escapes or conspiring to commit 
other illegal acts. Id. at 91. The Court held that this ban was logically related to 
the prison’s purported security concerns. In fact, as the Court noted, such 
communication limitations even exist for parolees, who, after being released 
from prison, are often not allowed to communicate with known criminals. Id. at 
91–92. Furthermore, no ready alternatives to the communications ban existed; 
prison officials could monitor all inmate-to-inmate correspondence, but such 
monitoring procedures would be very costly and likely ineffective because 
prisoners often communicate in code. Id. at 93. According to the Court, 
however, the marriage regulation was not reasonably related to penological 
objectives. Id. at 99–100. While prison officials created the marriage regulation 
to prevent violent “love triangles” and to teach women prisoners “skills of self-
reliance,” the Court held that the marriage regulation was an “exaggerated 
response” to security concerns and, therefore, unreasonable. Id. at 97–98. 
Moreover, the Court held that the marriage regulation “[swept] much more 
broadly than can be explained by petitioners’ penological objectives.” Id. at 98.  
 40. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
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2. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz: Its Guiding Principles and 
Description of the Turner Test 
In O’Lone, two inmates in a New Jersey state prison 
challenged prison regulations that prevented them from leaving 
outside work detail to attend Jumu’ah, a weekly Muslim service 
that the Quran commands.41 The prisoners claimed that these 
regulations violated their free-exercise rights, while prison officials 
argued that the regulations were necessary security measures that 
prevented excess foot traffic in a “high security risk area.”42 Before 
addressing the constitutionality of the challenged regulation, the 
O’Lone Court set forth several principles that would guide its 
analysis.43 These principles underscore the limited nature of the 
free-exercise rights that inmates retain.  
The O’Lone Court made clear that a prisoner’s free-exercise 
rights are more limited than those of noninmates.44 The Court 
emphasized that “‘[l]awful incarceration brings about the 
necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a 
retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal 
system.’”45 According to the Court, these “limitations on the 
exercise of constitutional rights arise both from the fact of 
incarceration and from valid penological objectives—including 
deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional 
security.”46 With these principles in mind, the Court sought to 
apply a standard of review that would provide appropriate 
deference to prison officials—the Turner “reasonableness” test.47  
Before applying the Turner “reasonableness” test, however, the 
O’Lone Court provided its own description of the Turner test as 
well as the objectives the test sought to achieve.48 The Court 
posited that the Turner test was “less restrictive than [the test] 
ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental 
constitutional rights.”49 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the 
Turner test granted prison officials sufficient latitude to anticipate 
and respond to security and prison administration problems while 
avoiding “unnecessary intrusion of the judiciary into problems 
                                                                                                             
 41. Id. at 345. 
 42. Id. at 346. 
 43. See id. at 348–49. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Id. at 348 (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)). 
 46. Id. (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822–23 (1974); Procunier v. 
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974)). 
 47. See id. at 349. 
 48. Id. at 349–50.  
 49. Id. 
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particularly ill suited to ‘resolution by decree.’”50 Applying Turner 
to the New Jersey prison regulations at issue, the O’Lone Court 
held that the regulations were reasonably related to institutional 
order, safety, and rehabilitation interests and were therefore 
constitutional.51  
C. Nonprisoner Free Exercise 
Three years after Turner and O’Lone, a Supreme Court 
decision involving a nonprisoner free-exercise claim would cast 
doubt on Turner’s continued validity as applied to prisoner free-
exercise cases.52 In Employment Division v. Smith, the State of 
Oregon refused to pay unemployment benefits to two members of 
the Native American Church who were fired because of their 
religious use of peyote.53 The plaintiffs argued that this denial of 
benefits violated their free-exercise rights.54 To succeed on this 
claim, however, the plaintiffs essentially had to prove that an 
Oregon drug law banning all uses of peyote was unconstitutional 
under the Free Exercise Clause.55 The plaintiffs argued that the 
drug law was unconstitutional because it did not make an 
exception for the religious use of peyote.56 Furthermore, the 
plaintiffs argued that Sherbert provided the proper standard of 
review.57 The Court, however, declined to apply Sherbert and 
instead adopted a standard of review radically different from the 
                                                                                                             
 50. Id. at 349–50 (quoting Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405). 
 51. See id. at 350–53. The Court found the prison officials’ security 
concerns compelling. Excess movement of prisoners from outside work detail 
created congestion at the prison’s main gate and placed added pressures on 
security officers. Id. at 351. With regard to rehabilitation interests, the prison 
officials argued that the regulation prepared prisoners for their reentry into the 
workforce, where ex-prisoners would be required to maintain a steady work 
schedule and put in a full day’s work. Id. The Court also found this 
rehabilitation argument compelling. See id. Finally, the Court reasoned that, 
while certain Muslim prisoners would be denied Jumu’ah services, denial of 
these services did not prevent these prisoners from practicing their Muslim faith 
in other ways. Id. at 351–52. For instance, prison officials provided Muslim 
prisoners with a pork-free diet and made special arrangements for Muslim 
prisoners during the month of Ramadan. Id. at 352.  
 52. See Levitan v. Ashcroft, 281 F.3d 1313, 1318–19 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 53. See 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).  
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. at 875–76. 
 56. See id.  
 57. Id. at 876. 
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strict scrutiny analysis that had previously been applied in 
nonprisoner free-exercise cases.58  
The Smith Court held that a person’s religious beliefs do not 
alleviate his obligation to abide by neutral laws of general 
applicability, such as the drug law in question.59 According to the 
Court, such a broad-based, categorical rule was necessary in free-
exercise cases.60 The Court reasoned that applying Sherbert’s 
“compelling government interest” test to neutral, generally 
applicable laws would allow every man “to become a law unto 
himself.”61 In other words, under the “compelling government 
interest” test, a person could refuse to abide by any generally 
applicable law by claiming that his religious beliefs command him 
to do so.62 And according to the Court, such an anomaly 
“contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.”63  
While the Smith Court largely removed free-exercise claims 
from judicial review, it reasoned that free-exercise rights would 
find a new source of protection through the political process.64 
                                                                                                             
 58. See Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretations: A Critique 
of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 153 (“Under [Smith], 
‘neutral, generally applicable law[s]’ are categorically exempt from 
constitutional scrutiny, even when they prohibit or substantially burden religious 
exercise.” (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 881)). 
 59. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883–85.  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 884–85 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 
(1878)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 885 (explaining that past courts had never used the Sherbert 
“compelling government interest” test to invalidate a criminal law of general 
applicability, and reasoning that the “sounder approach” is to hold Sherbert 
inapplicable to challenges of such laws).  
 64. Id. at 890. Of course, to be constitutionally valid, any law must be at 
least rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See Robert W. Bennett, 
“Mere” Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic 
Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1979). But above and beyond this mere 
rationality requirement, courts applying Smith will only examine a law to make 
sure that it is neutral and generally applicable. If a law is neutral and generally 
applicable, i.e., if it does not speak of religion and its objective is not to burden 
free exercise, then it has not offended the Free Exercise Clause under Smith. See 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 559–62 
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente 
Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006) (“[In Smith, we] held that the 
Constitution does not require judges to engage in a case-by-case assessment of 
the religious burdens imposed by facially constitutional laws.”); Locke v. 
Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 731 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[We are no longer] in 
the business of reviewing facially neutral laws that merely happen to burden 
some individual’s religious exercise . . . .”); Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. 
Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1213 (5th Cir. 1991) (“We need not review the 
court’s analysis because the Supreme Court’s decision in [Employment Division 
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According to the Smith majority, “Values that are protected against 
government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights 
are not thereby banished from the political process.”65 Therefore, if 
society is dissatisfied with the Constitution’s lack of free-exercise 
protections, the legislature can pass laws providing greater free-
exercise rights.66 The Court recognized, however, “that leaving 
accommodation [of religious free exercise] to the political process 
will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that 
are not widely engaged in . . . .”67 But according to the Smith 
majority, such an “unavoidable consequence of democratic 
government must be preferred to a system in which each 
conscience is a law unto itself . . . .”68 Since the Smith decision, 
this bright-line rule remains the standard for evaluating 
nonprisoners’ free-exercise claims.69 Crucially, however, the Court 
did not address Smith’s applicability to prison regulations.  
Since the Smith decision, circuit courts have continued to apply 
Turner to prisoner free-exercise claims,70 but this application of 
Turner may be misguided. While few courts or scholars have 
compared the two standards, Smith appears to require less judicial 
scrutiny than Turner.71 If so, then courts are essentially providing 
greater free-exercise protection to prisoners than to free persons. 
These disparate standards contradict commonsense as well as the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning behind the Turner standard. In Turner, 
the Supreme Court recognized the simple fact that free persons, 
unencumbered by incarceration, possess greater constitutional 
rights than prisoners.72 But the Supreme Court’s underlying 
assumption no longer holds if Turner requires greater judicial 
scrutiny than Smith. Before such a determination can be made, 
however, an in-depth comparison of the Smith and Turner 
standards is necessary.   
                                                                                                             
 
v. Smith] eviscerates judicial scrutiny of generally applicable criminal statutes in 
response to free exercise challenges.” (citations omitted)).  
 65. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 531 (“In addressing the constitutional 
protection for free exercise of religion, our cases establish the general 
proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental 
effect of burdening a particular religious practice.” (citing Smith, 494 U.S. 872)). 
 70. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 133–34. 
 71. See discussion infra Part II; see also infra notes 133–35. 
 72. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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II. THE SMITH–TURNER PARADOX 
A comparison of Smith and Turner reveals the actual amount of 
judicial scrutiny that each standard requires. While both standards 
are deferential to the state, Turner ultimately requires courts to 
examine free-exercise claims with greater solicitude than the 
standard articulated in Smith. In other words, justifying a 
regulation under Turner is more difficult for the state than under 
Smith. In reaching this conclusion, this Part compares the structure 
and plain language of Smith and Turner, as well as circuit court 
applications of the two standards.73  
A. Comparison of the Structure and Plain Language of Smith and 
Turner  
While the Smith and Turner standards are not completely 
different, the structural and plain language differences between the 
standards are significant. As with any constitutional standard, 
Smith and Turner require that, at a minimum, regulations withstand 
rational basis scrutiny.74 In other words, to be valid under Smith or 
Turner—or any other constitutional standard of review—a 
regulation must be rationally related to a legitimate government 
interest.75 But above this baseline rationality requirement, Smith 
only requires that a regulation be neutral and generally 
applicable.76 Therefore, if a law survives a rational basis review 
and is neutral and generally applicable, it does not violate the First 
Amendment under Smith.77 Under Turner, however, the analysis is 
more nuanced.  
                                                                                                             
 73. At least one scholar has presented the possibility that, in reality, Smith 
and Turner embody the same standard. See Benjamin Pi-wei Liu, A Prisoner’s 
Right to Religious Diet Beyond the Free Exercise Clause, 51 UCLA L. REV. 
1151, 1197 n.192 (2004). For instance, the Smith majority cites O’Lone as an 
example of the Court’s past deviations from the Sherbert standard. Id. Perhaps 
the Court was trying to apply the same “reasonableness” standard in Smith. Id. 
This fleeting reference to O’Lone in Smith, however, provides little ground upon 
which to form a solid conclusion. A more reasoned determination of the 
standards’ relative levels of scrutiny comes from a comparison of their structure 
and plain language, as well as the circuit courts’ interpretations of the standards.  
 74. See Bennett, supra note 64, at 1049 (“The United States Supreme Court 
has long insisted, as a matter of constitutional doctrine, that legislative action 
must be rationally related to the accomplishment of some legitimate state 
purpose.”). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 77. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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Turner ultimately requires courts to evaluate free-exercise 
claims under a higher level of scrutiny than Smith requires. To be 
valid under Turner—as is the case under Smith—a regulation must 
be neutral, and it must also withstand a rational basis review.78 But 
under Turner, unlike Smith, a court must engage in a four-part 
balancing test that assesses a regulation’s reasonableness.79 This 
“reasonableness test” requires a court to weigh interests that are 
effectively ignored under Smith. For instance, a court applying the 
second prong of Turner’s balancing test must examine whether the 
plaintiff has other means of exercising the religious right in 
question.80 Additionally, Turner’s fourth prong requires courts to 
explore the existence of ready alternatives to the challenged 
regulation.81 While these added strictures of the Turner balancing 
test may seem minor, they can have a significant practical effect.82  
B. Practical Effect of the Differences Between Smith and Turner 
and a Comparison of Circuit Court Applications of the Two 
Standards 
The practical effect of the structural and plain language 
differences between Smith and Turner is quite simple: Turner’s 
four-part balancing test allows courts to subject prison regulations 
to a case-by-case review, while Smith’s neutrality rule forces 
courts to address a regulation’s constitutionality in a categorical 
fashion. The former type of review provides courts with a degree 
of judicial flexibility that is unavailable under the latter. As such, 
                                                                                                             
 78. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Regarding the neutrality 
requirement, the Turner Court noted: “We have found it important to inquire 
whether prison regulations restricting inmates’ First Amendment rights operated 
in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression.” Id. at 90. 
Furthermore, the first factor of the Turner analysis determines whether a rational 
basis standard has been met. The first factor asks whether a “valid, rational 
connection” exists between the prison regulation and the government interest 
justifying it. Id. at 89.  
 79. Id. at 89–91.  
 80. Id. at 90. 
 81. Id. at 90–91. Furthermore, the Turner Court stated that “the existence of 
obvious, easy alternatives [to the challenged regulation] may be evidence that 
the regulation is not reasonable, but is an ‘exaggerated response’ to prison 
concerns.” Id. at 90 (emphasis added). This “exaggerated response” language of 
Turner further evidences the Turner standard’s added restrictiveness. Under a 
mere rational basis test, such as Smith, “exaggerated responses” are perfectly 
permissible. Under a rational basis test, the government need only show that its 
means of achieving its goal were not arbitrary or irrational, and “[t]he fact that 
[a] policy was a ‘response’ at all—even an exaggerated one—would refute the 
contention that it was arbitrary or irrational.” Keegan, supra note 6, at 332–33.  
 82. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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two courts applying Turner can reach different conclusions when 
analyzing the same regulation—a result significantly less likely 
under Smith.83 A comparison of circuit court applications of Turner 
and Smith further illustrates this practical effect of the standards’ 
structural and plain language differences.  
In Scott v. Mississippi Department of Corrections, the Fifth 
Circuit applied Turner and held that a Rastafarian prisoner was not 
exempt from a prison regulation banning long hair, sideburns, and 
beards.84 In Scott, the prison officials argued that the regulation 
was reasonably related to prison safety concerns because it 
precluded prisoners from radically altering their hairstyles as a 
means of preventing identification after an escape.85 Balancing the 
Turner factors, the Scott court agreed with the prison officials’ 
argument and upheld the regulation as facially reasonable.86 In its 
Turner analysis, the Scott court sought to determine whether the 
regulation was reasonable as applied to the general prison 
population.87 The court did not address whether, or how, the 
particular facts of the plaintiff’s case affected the regulation’s 
reasonableness.88  
In Flagner v. Wilkinson, however, the Sixth Circuit took a 
different approach to the Turner analysis and declined to uphold an 
identical grooming regulation.89 In Flagner, a Hasidic Jewish 
prisoner challenged an Ohio prisoner grooming regulation that 
prohibited growing long sidelocks.90 Just as prison officials argued 
in Scott, prison officials in Flagner defended the grooming 
regulation by claiming that it aided in escape prevention.91 In 
Flagner, however, the court found this argument unpersuasive.92 
Unlike the Scott court, the Flagner court examined the regulation’s 
reasonableness in light of the particular facts of the plaintiff’s 
                                                                                                             
 83. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 84. Scott v. Miss. Dep’t of Corr., 961 F.2d 77, 78–81 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 85. See Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 15, Scott v. Miss. Dep’t of Corr., 
961 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1992) (No. 91-1538). 
 86. Scott, 961 F.2d at 80–82. 
 87. Id. at 80 (“[P]enal authorities may need a hard and fast rule in dealing 
with certain continuing or recurring situations, even when that rule could be 
better tailored to the rights of individual prisoners through a court’s flexible, 
case-by-case analysis.”). 
 88. See id.  
 89. See Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 477–88 (6th Cir. 2001).  
 90. Id. at 477–78. 
 91. Id. at 485–86. 
 92. Id. at 486. 
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case.93 While the Flagner court recognized that the grooming 
regulation might be reasonable when applied to the general prison 
population, the court found that the regulation was potentially 
unreasonable when applied to the particular facts of the plaintiff’s 
case.94 As proof of the regulation’s unreasonableness, the Flagner 
court pointed to the fact that the plaintiff had never attempted to 
escape from prison in the past.95 Therefore, the Flagner court—
unlike the Scott court—held that the State’s escape prevention 
argument did little to justify the free-exercise burdens that the 
grooming regulation placed on the plaintiff.96  
Scott and Flagner illustrate how the Turner factors can lead to 
disparate results when applied to the same nucleus of operative 
facts. This disparity in judicial outcomes is unlikely under Smith. If 
the Fifth and Sixth Circuits had applied Smith to the prisoner 
grooming regulations at issue in Scott and Flagner, both courts 
would have almost certainly reached the same conclusion and 
validated the regulations. The grooming regulations in Scott and 
Flagner forbade all prisoners from maintaining hair longer than 
three inches from the scalp and required all prisoners to keep their 
beards and sideburns neatly trimmed.97 These grooming 
regulations are neutral and generally applicable and therefore do 
not present a First Amendment violation under Smith.98  
However, the Scott and Flagner courts applied Turner’s 
balancing test—not Smith’s categorical rule. Under Turner, the 
Scott and Flagner courts enjoyed a degree of judicial flexibility 
that is unavailable under Smith. As such, the Scott and Flagner 
courts were able to reach different conclusions when evaluating 
                                                                                                             
 93. See id. at 484–88 (explaining that the plaintiff did not have disciplinary 
problems in the past—a fact that tended to show the unreasonableness of the 
prison’s grooming regulation as applied to the plaintiff).  
 94. See id. at 477–88. The Flagner court held that the plaintiff had 
presented a valid issue of fact concerning whether the State had violated his 
constitutional free-exercise rights. Therefore, the case was remanded for further 
proceedings on the issue. Id. The district court’s review—if any—of the issue is 
unpublished. 
 95. See id. at 485–86 (“In addition to a photograph of Flagner, the 
defendants also have on file four professionally-made sketches of him bearing 
various beard and sidelock lengths and one sketch of Flagner with no facial hair 
at all. In the event that Flagner ever escaped from prison, these sketches would 
help to identify him because they show a range of his possible appearances.”). 
 96. See id. 
 97. Scott v. Miss. Dep’t of Corr., 961 F.2d 77, 78 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(presenting the Mississippi prison grooming regulation); Flagner, 241 F.3d at 
977–78 n.1 (presenting the Ohio prison grooming regulation). 
 98. Neither the Mississippi grooming regulation at issue in Scott nor the 
Ohio prison grooming regulation at issue in Flagner mentions religion, and both 
are applicable to all prisoners. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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essentially the same regulation. This practical effect of the 
differences between Turner and Smith—namely, that Turner 
provides greater judicial latitude than Smith—is further illustrated 
in the Seventh Circuit case of Sasnett v. Litscher.99  
In Sasnett, Judge Posner undertook a thorough comparison of 
Turner and Smith.100 Judge Posner noted that “Turner and O’Lone 
can . . . be interpreted to require prison authorities to make a 
reasonable accommodation to the inmates’ religious desires, but 
Smith cannot be.”101 Judge Posner highlighted the practical 
implications of Turner’s reasonableness requirement by applying 
Smith and Turner to a hypothetical prisoner jewelry ban.102 Posner 
stated: 
If the Wisconsin prison system forbade inmates to have any 
jewelry, it would be difficult under Smith for inmates to 
claim that the Constitution entitled them to an exemption 
for religious jewelry, whereas under the regime of Turner–
O’Lone we would have to uphold the claim because of the 
feebleness of the state’s safety argument . . . .103  
As Posner’s hypothetical demonstrates, the added judicial 
flexibility of the Turner analysis allows a court to strike down a 
prison regulation that would be otherwise valid under Smith. In 
essence then, the state’s task of proving a prison regulation’s 
constitutionality is more onerous under Turner than it would be 
under Smith.104  
Smith is currently the constitutional standard of review for 
nonprisoner free-exercise claims, while Turner is the standard for 
prisoner claims.105 Unlike Smith, the Turner balancing test invites 
greater judicial scrutiny of prison regulations and imposes a 
                                                                                                             
 99. 197 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 1999) (writing in dicta), abrogated by 
Braden v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 100. See id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Judge Posner echoed this sentiment in the recent case of Grayson v. 
Schuler, 666 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 2012). In Grayson, the court addressed the 
constitutionality of a prison regulation that forbade all prisoners, except 
Rastafarians, from maintaining long hair. Although Judge Posner’s discussion of 
Smith and Turner was relegated to dicta, he emphatically maintained that under 
Smith, prisons could “authorize any ban on long hair as long as it is not 
motivated by religious prejudices or opinions.” Id. at 452. Under Turner, 
however, “prison authorities [must] ‘accommodate’ an inmate’s religious 
preferences if consistent with security and other legitimate penological 
concerns.” Id. at 453. 
 105. Levitan v. Ashcroft, 281 F.3d 1313, 1318–19 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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heightened burden on the state in defending these regulations. 
Therefore, by making it more difficult for the state to defend 
against prisoners’ free-exercise claims, courts are essentially 
providing more protection to prisoner free-exercise rights than to 
nonprisoner free-exercise rights.106 This result is odd considering 
the Supreme Court’s motives behind the creation of the Turner 
standard.  
III. TURNER: AN ANOMALY OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROPORTIONS  
In both the Turner and O’Lone opinions, the Supreme Court 
presented a number of principles that guided its application of the 
Turner “reasonableness” test.107 First, the Court acknowledged that 
prisoners retain the right to free exercise.108 According to the 
Court, however, incarceration brings about this right’s necessary 
withdrawal or limitation.109 Second, the Court recognized that the 
judiciary is ill-equipped to deal with the urgent problems of prison 
administration.110 Third, the Court reasoned that prison 
administration is a task that should be relegated to the other 
branches of government.111 With these principles in mind, the 
Court sought to apply a standard of review that would protect 
prisoners’ free-exercise rights while providing sufficient deference 
to prison officials.112 At first, the application of Turner to prisoner 
free-exercise claims may have advanced these principles and 
objectives. In light of Smith, however, the continued application of 
Turner is antithetical to its own foundational purposes for three 
reasons. 
First, Turner unnecessarily expands, rather than limits, prisoner 
rights. Other than free exercise, no constitutional right receives 
more protection inside a prison than without.113 Such a result not 
                                                                                                             
 106. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 107. Compare Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1987), with O’Lone v. 
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348–50 (1987).  
 108. O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 349. 
 109. Id. at 349–50.  
 110. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84. 
 111. Id. 
 112. O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 349. 
 113. In fact, very few constitutional rights even receive the same protection 
within prison walls as they do in free society. In the few situations where the 
Supreme Court has held that a particular right is not limited in a prison setting, 
the Court has had good reasons for doing so. For example, the Supreme Court 
has held that a prisoner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection is 
evaluated under strict scrutiny, as is the case with nonprisoners’ equal protection 
rights. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510–11 (2005). However, the 
Johnson Court held that “compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on 
2012] COMMENT 235 
 
 
 
only violates commonsense, but it also violates an unbroken chain 
of Supreme Court reasoning. In O’Lone, and in a number of other 
cases, the Supreme Court held that prisoners’ rights are necessarily 
limited by reason of their incarceration.114 According to O’Lone, 
“[L]imitations on the exercise of constitutional rights arise both 
from the fact of incarceration and from valid penological 
objectives—including deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of 
prisoners, and institutional security.”115 Therefore, the Court 
originally applied Turner to prisoner free-exercise claims as a 
means of limiting free-exercise rights.116 Since Smith, however, the 
Court has examined the free-exercise claims of private citizens 
under a lower level of scrutiny than is demanded by Turner.117 
Turner no longer acts as a necessary limitation of rights “aris[ing] 
from the fact of incarceration and from valid penological 
objectives.”118 Instead, Turner acts as an unintended expansion of 
rights that defies the fact of incarceration.  
Second, the continued application of Turner inhibits 
penological objectives. The Court created the Turner standard as a 
relief from strict scrutiny that would allow prison officials to 
                                                                                                             
 
racial discrimination is not only consistent with proper prison administration, 
but also bolsters the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system. Race 
discrimination is especially pernicious in the administration of justice. And 
public respect for our system of justice is undermined when the system 
discriminates based on race.” Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). As a general proposition, however, prisoners’ rights are limited in the 
prison context. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (restricting 
the contents of incoming and outgoing prisoner mail); Pell v. Procunier, 417 
U.S. 817 (1974) (restricting face-to-face media interviews with individual 
inmates); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (prohibiting 
meetings, solicitations, and bulk mailings related to a prison union); Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (restricting inmates’ receipt of hardcover books 
not mailed directly from publishers, book clubs, or book stores); Block v. 
Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984) (banning contact visits); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 
490 U.S. 401 (1989) (restricting inmates’ receipt of subscription publications); 
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (limiting a prisoner’s due process 
rights); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (restricting inmates’ access to 
courts); Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001) (limiting an inmate’s right to 
correspondence); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (limiting a 
prisoners’ freedom of association).  
 114. See, e.g., O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348–50 (1987); 
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510 (“[C]ertain privileges and rights must 
necessarily be limited in the prison context.”).  
 115. O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348. 
 116. See id. at 348 (citing Pell, 417 U.S. at 822–23; Martinez, 416 U.S. at 
412).  
 117. See discussion supra Part.II.A–B. 
 118. See O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348. 
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account for the prison environment’s exigencies and hostilities.119 
Since Smith, however, the strict scrutiny of nonprisoner free-
exercise claims has disappeared, while the exigencies and 
hostilities of prisons have worsened.120 While Turner is still a 
deferential standard, it is needlessly restrictive in light of Smith. 
Turner ultimately subjects neutral and generally applicable prison 
regulations to a higher level of scrutiny than comparable 
regulations outside the prison context. 
Third, Turner creates unnecessary judicial intrusion into the 
other branches of government. The Turner Court recognized that 
prison administration is a task relegated to the legislative and 
executive branches.121 As such, the Court sought to grant much 
deference to prison officials’ decisions to avoid unnecessarily 
violating separation of powers principles.122 Undoubtedly, Turner 
did grant significant deference to prison officials compared to the 
Sherbert standard.123 Smith, on the other hand, gave nearly 
complete deference to the state in nonprisoner cases and evaluated 
nonprisoner claims in a categorical fashion.124 Meanwhile, Turner 
still allows courts to subject prisoner free-exercise claims to a case-
by-case review.125 This simple difference between the Turner and 
Smith standards makes it possible for prisoners—but not private 
citizens—to continually challenge prison regulations already ruled 
constitutional.126 Considering the need for judicial restraint in the 
                                                                                                             
 119. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1987).  
 120. In the 1990s alone, the number of prisoners affiliated with gangs more 
than doubled. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 533 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). With names like the “Aryan Brotherhood,” the “Black Guerrilla 
Family,” and the “Mexican Mafia,” many of these prison gangs are formed 
along racial lines and perpetuate bigotry and violence in America’s prisons. Id. 
Prison gangs can be highly regimented groups committing crimes such as drug 
trafficking, theft, and murder. Id.  
 121. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 85. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See Keegan, supra note 6, at 300–01 (stating that both Turner and Smith 
are deferential compared to Sherbert but are different nonetheless). 
 124. See McConnell, supra note 58, at 153 (“Under [Smith], ‘neutral, 
generally applicable law[s]’ are categorically exempt from constitutional 
scrutiny, even when they prohibit or substantially burden religious exercise.” 
(quoting Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 881 (1990))). 
 125. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 126. Under Turner, courts can invalidate a previously upheld regulation if a 
subsequent application of that regulation is deemed unreasonable. For example, 
the Sixth Circuit held that an Ohio prisoner grooming policy—despite having 
survived numerous Turner challenges—was potentially unreasonable as applied 
to the particular facts of the case. See Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 484–
88 (6th Cir. 2001); id. at 488 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Ohio 
regulation had been previously upheld on multiple occasions). Not all courts 
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realm of prison administration, it makes no sense for courts to 
adjudicate claims that would be meritless had they not originated 
in prisons.127 Doing so creates needless judicial intrusion into the 
other branches of government and violates separation of powers 
principles.  
The assumptions and objectives behind the Supreme Court’s 
creation of the Turner standard are as true and applicable today as 
in 1987. Since the Smith decision, however, the continued 
application of Turner contradicts the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
underlying the standard’s creation. Now, Turner expands 
prisoners’ rights, inhibits penological objectives, and violates 
separation of powers principles. For various reasons, however, 
Turner has remained the status quo in the circuit courts.128 
Unfortunately, the circuit courts’ justifications for Turner’s 
continued application do little to rectify the logical inconsistencies 
that Turner now creates.  
IV. A SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE: THE POST-SMITH 
APPLICATION OF TURNER 
While the Supreme Court has not weighed in on the interplay 
between Smith and Turner,129 a number of circuit courts have 
acknowledged the issue.130 More often than not, circuit courts 
continue to evaluate prisoner free-exercise claims under Turner.131 
But of the circuits that continue to apply Turner to prisoner free-
exercise claims, only three—the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits—have explicitly held that Smith did not displace 
                                                                                                             
 
agree that a previously validated regulation is subject to subsequent, case-by-
case review. See Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22, 25 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining that 
a Rastafarian is not entitled to a particular case-by-case analysis of a previously 
upheld grooming policy simply because he was not in the general prison 
population). The Supreme Court declined to address the issue, so courts are still 
free to apply Turner to previously upheld prison regulations. Wilkinson v. 
Flagner, 534 U.S. 1071 (2001) (denying state petitioner’s writ of certiorari).  
 127. Flagner, 241 F.3d at 489–91 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (explaining how 
the need for judicial restraint in the realm of prison administration warrants a 
categorical approach to prisoner free-exercise claims). 
 128. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 129. The Supreme Court has not decided a prisoner free-exercise claim since 
O’Lone, which was decided three years before Smith.  
 130. See cases cited infra notes 133–34.  
 131. See Pi-wei Liu, supra note 73, at 1196–97. 
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Turner.132 The Second, Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have 
all recognized the tension between Smith and Turner but have 
refused to decide the issue and have continued to apply Turner by 
default.133 Only the Fourth, Seventh, and, arguably, the D.C. 
Circuit have ever applied the Smith neutrality principle to prisoner 
free-exercise claims.134  
The circuit courts that continue to apply Turner have presented 
a number of justifications for doing so. Of them, three primary 
justifications have emerged. The first, and most common, of these 
justifications advances Turner as the de facto standard of review 
that should govern when the state fails to raise Smith.135 However, 
this justification does not advance Turner as a reasonable—or even 
preferable—alternative to Smith. The second justification for 
Turner maintains that no conflict exists between Smith and Turner 
because “Smith does not alter the rights of prisoners; it simply 
brings the free exercise rights of private citizens closer to those of 
prisoners.”136 The third and most ardent justification argues that 
                                                                                                             
 132. See Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 481 (6th Cir. 2001); Salaam v. 
Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168, 1171 n.7 (8th Cir. 1990); Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 
877 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 133. See Levitan v. Ashcroft, 281 F.3d 1313, 1318–19 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(examining in great depth the potential effects that Smith could have on the 
Turner analysis and noting that “many courts have grappled with the question of 
how the Court’s decision in Smith interacts with the prisoner-specific test set 
forth in Turner and O’Lone,” but applying Turner because neither party raised 
the issue); Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 274 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006) (declining 
to explore “what effect the Supreme Court’s decision in [Smith] has on the 
O’Lone standards for judging prisoner free-exercise claims because neither party 
argues that Smith changes the analysis”); Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1219 n.3 
(10th Cir. 2007) (noting “unresolved tension” between Turner and Smith but 
declining to address the issue because the government did not raise it); Boles v. 
Neet, 486 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2007) (suggesting Turner is “sharply at 
odds with the test formulated three years later in [Smith]” but declining to 
address the issue for the same reason).  
 134. See Hines v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 148 F.3d 353, 357–58 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(applying both Smith and Turner to a prisoner grooming policy and validating 
the policy under both standards); Smith v. Ozmint, 578 F.3d 246, 251 (4th Cir. 
2009) (exclusively applying the Smith neutrality principle); Borzych v. Frank, 
439 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the First Amendment “does 
not require the accommodation of religious practice: states may enforce neutral 
rules” (citing Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S 
872 (1990); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987))). The standard 
in the D.C. Circuit is somewhat unclear. See Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 
669, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (upholding a federal prisoner DNA harvesting 
statute—not a prison regulation per se—under Smith). But see Levitan, 281 F.3d 
at 1318–19 (applying Turner to a prisoner free-exercise claim because neither 
party raised the Smith issue).  
 135. See cases cited supra note 133.  
 136. Salaam, 905 F.2d at 1171 n.7. 
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courts cannot realistically apply Smith—a nonprisoner case—in the 
hyper-regulated prison environment.137  
The circuit courts’ three primary justifications for the 
continued application of Turner are unpersuasive. These 
justifications avoid the conflict between Smith and Turner, 
erroneously compare the two standards, or misinterpret Smith’s 
practical ramifications. This Part presents in greater detail the 
primary arguments for Turner’s continued viability and further 
explains why these arguments are unconvincing.  
A. If It’s Not Broken, Don’t Fix It: Applying Turner by Default 
A surprising number of circuit courts have examined in depth 
the potential conflicts between Smith and Turner, yet they have 
continued to apply Turner simply because the states have failed to 
argue that Smith should govern.138 This Comment refers to this 
application of Turner as an “application by default.” While this 
kind of judicial inaction is not without historical and 
jurisprudential support, it does little to provide a logical basis for 
the continued use of Turner.  
A circuit court’s unwillingness to decide the Smith–Turner 
issue sua sponte is likely rooted in legal philosophy. One of the 
basic features of the American adversarial legal system is party 
control over case presentation.139 Typically, an adversarial system 
is defined as one in which the parties present the facts and legal 
arguments to a passive decision-maker who then decides the case 
on the parties’ terms.140 In this adversarial system, judges are 
strongly discouraged from engaging in “issue creation”—the act of 
raising legal claims and arguments that the parties overlooked.141 
Therefore, if the government fails to argue that Smith should 
govern a prisoner free-exercise case, a judge will likely maintain 
the status quo and resolve the dispute by applying Turner. This 
“hands-off” approach allows a judge to avoid overturning 
precedent.  
Moreover, Turner, as applied in O’Lone, is still technically 
“good” law because the Supreme Court has never explicitly 
overruled Turner.142 Thus, no constitutional limitation impedes 
lower courts from applying Turner to prisoner free-exercise 
                                                                                                             
 137. Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 138. See cases cited supra note 133. 
 139. Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 449 (2009). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Sasnett v. Litscher, 197 F.3d 290, 293 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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cases.143 In fact, some circuit courts have implied that they have a 
constitutional duty to uphold Turner until the Supreme Court holds 
otherwise.144 For example, Judge Posner stated that “Smith . . . did 
not purport to overrule or limit Turner and O’Lone; and the 
Supreme Court has instructed us to leave the overruling of its 
decisions to it.”145 Judge Posner’s assertion is not without merit.  
The Supreme Court has described stare decisis as reflecting “a 
policy judgment that ‘in most matters it is more important that the 
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.’”146 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated: “If a precedent of this 
Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on 
reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of 
Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to 
this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”147 
Against this backdrop of stare decisis, nothing prevents courts 
from applying Turner by default when the parties fail to raise 
Smith. But applying Turner by default is clearly a decision based 
on expediency rather than merit.  
When courts apply Turner simply because Smith was not 
raised, they are essentially choosing Turner because it is the 
“settled” standard, as opposed to the “right” standard. Thus, the 
application of Turner by default says very little, if anything, about 
the standard’s inherent merits. This type of application provides 
only tangential support for Turner’s continued validity and avoids 
the conflict between Turner and Smith altogether. Therefore, courts 
should provide more compelling justifications for Turner’s 
continued use when forced to address the Turner–Smith conflict 
head-on. 
B. Second Justification: Smith Did Not Surpass Turner 
In Salaam v. Lockhart, the Eighth Circuit held that Smith does 
not affect the Turner analysis because Smith “simply brings the 
free exercise rights of private citizens closer to those of 
prisoners.”148 Essentially, this argument claims that noninmates’ 
free-exercise rights under Smith are still greater than, or at least 
                                                                                                             
 143. See Keegan, supra note 6, at 301. 
 144. See Sasnett, 197 F.3d at 293; Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 452–53 
(7th Cir. 2012).  
 145. Sasnett, 197 F.3d at 292. 
 146. State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (quoting Agostini v. 
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997)). 
 147. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson–Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 
(1989). 
 148. Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168, 1171 n.7 (8th Cir. 1990). 
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equal to, prisoners’ free-exercise rights under Turner. Therefore, if 
noninmates have more free-exercise rights than prisoners, no 
conflict exists between Smith and Turner, and nothing prevents a 
court from applying Turner. This argument is flawed because it 
compares the two standards according to the wrong criterion and, 
by doing so, fails to recognize the actual conflict between Smith 
and Turner.  
To determine which test is applicable to prisoner free-exercise 
claims, the Eighth Circuit compared Smith and Turner according to 
the amount of religious freedom a person typically enjoys under 
each standard. As the Salaam court correctly pointed out, prison 
regulations commonly subject prisoners to a strict daily routine 
that is foreign to free society.149 Unlike prisoners, private citizens 
are generally not required to wake, eat, and sleep at predetermined 
times.150 Furthermore, free persons are unlikely to be governed by 
strict grooming and uniform policies.151 Whereas an unyielding 
prison regimen can often prevent a prisoner from exercising his 
religious rights on his own terms, a private citizen is generally free 
to engage in religious expression any way he sees fit. Therefore, a 
typical prisoner whose free-exercise rights are evaluated under 
Turner will have less religious freedom than a nonprisoner whose 
rights are evaluated under Smith. Based on this comparison of 
Smith and Turner, the Eighth Circuit held that Smith “[brought] the 
free exercise rights of private citizens closer to those of prisoners” 
but did not affect the Turner analysis.152 In reality, however, Smith 
did affect the Turner analysis, and the Salaam court failed to notice 
this because it based its comparison of the two standards on the 
wrong criterion. Instead of comparing the amount of religious 
freedom that prisoners and nonprisoners typically enjoy, the court 
should have compared the amount of constitutional protection that 
the Smith and Turner tests mandate.  
The Smith and Turner Courts sought to protect free-exercise 
rights by creating standards of review under which future courts 
must examine alleged First Amendment violations. The strictness 
of a standard of review is directly proportional to the amount of 
judicial oversight a court must undertake to protect the 
constitutional right at stake.153 For instance, courts applying strict 
                                                                                                             
 149. Id. at 1169. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 1171 n.7. 
 153. In his dissenting opinion in O’Lone, Justice Brennan explained how 
rights are protected by the courts according to the varying degree of scrutiny 
applied: 
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scrutiny to a challenged regulation will delve into the motives and 
purposes behind the regulation to ensure that the state possesses a 
“compelling government interest” and that the chosen regulation is 
the “least restrictive means” of achieving that interest.154 
Alternatively, courts applying minimal scrutiny are unwilling to 
engage in any extensive exegesis and instead validate laws that are 
only rationally related to some legitimate government end.155 
Because separation of powers principles generally prevent courts 
from directly overseeing legislative or executive actions, courts 
can only protect a right by guaranteeing that alleged infringements 
of that right will be examined under a particular level of scrutiny. 
The actual amount of rights that a particular group enjoys is not 
within the court’s direct control, and the Eighth Circuit erred when 
it compared Smith and Turner based on this criterion.  
A more accurate comparison of Smith and Turner focuses on 
the level of scrutiny that each test requires. As the foregoing has 
demonstrated, Turner requires a higher level of scrutiny than 
Smith.156 Therefore, Turner guarantees more constitutional 
protection of free-exercise rights than Smith. In order to make an 
informed decision between Smith and Turner, a court must 
determine whether it is willing to afford more constitutional 
protection to prisoners’ free-exercise rights than to nonprisoners’ 
free-exercise rights. By comparing Smith and Turner according to 
the wrong criterion, the Eighth Circuit failed to make this decision.  
                                                                                                             
 
A standard of review frames the terms in which justification may be 
offered, and thus delineates the boundaries within which argument may 
take place. The use of differing levels of scrutiny proclaims that on 
some occasions, official power must justify itself in a way that 
otherwise it need not. A relatively strict standard of review is a signal 
that a decree prohibiting a political demonstration on the basis of the 
participants’ political beliefs is of more serious concern, and therefore 
will be scrutinized more closely, than a rule limiting the number of 
demonstrations that may take place downtown at noon. 
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 357 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted). Cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 
432, 440–42 (1985) (explaining how the courts protect various Fourteenth 
Amendment rights according to the varying degree of scrutiny applied).  
 154. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718–19 (1981) (illustrating 
the extensive exegesis a court will undertake in applying strict scrutiny to a 
regulation). 
 155. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
641 (17th ed. 2010) (“[Rational basis] review does not demand anything 
approaching a perfect fit to an actual purpose; any conceivable rational basis is 
enough.”).  
 156. See discussion supra Part II. 
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C. Third Justification: Smith Was Not a Prison Case 
Only the Ninth Circuit has explicitly acknowledged its 
intention to apply Turner over Smith as a means of providing 
greater free-exercise protection to prisoners than to 
nonprisoners.157 The Ninth Circuit’s primary argument against the 
application of Smith to prisoner free-exercise claims is rather 
straightforward: Smith was not a prison case and is not applicable 
in the prison setting.158 As Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain stated in 
Ward v. Walsh, “[i]nmates must rely on the prison system to 
provide them with the necessities of life. Determining to what 
extent prison officials must accommodate a prisoner’s right to free 
exercise in fulfilling this obligation is wholly different from 
determining whether free citizens must obey criminal laws of 
general applicability.”159 Judge O’Scannlain is essentially arguing 
that prisoners are at the complete mercy of the government and 
only possess the free-exercise rights that the government is willing 
to provide them. He therefore posits that prisoner free-exercise 
rights need Turner’s built-in protections to avoid being obliterated 
under Smith.160 This argument, while facially plausible, lacks 
jurisprudential and historical support.  
The Court created Turner as a necessary limitation of 
prisoners’ rights.161 Only after Smith, which was a rather unpopular 
decision, have courts presented the idea that Turner is a necessary 
expansion of free-exercise rights.162 While the Supreme Court 
recognized that prisoners still retain free-exercise protection within 
prison walls, the Court has never held or insinuated that prisoners 
should receive more free-exercise protection than nonprisoners. 
Furthermore, history has disproved the argument that Smith is 
incapable of protecting prisoners’ rights.163 Under Smith, prisoners 
have received significant political protections, and, thus, Judge 
O’Scannlain’s fears have not materialized.  
                                                                                                             
 157. Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Geoffrey S. Frankel, Untangling First Amendment Values: The 
Prisoners’ Dilemma, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1614, 1644–45 (1991) (“The 
Court’s reliance on legislatures was premised, in part, on its belief that the 
political process would work to provide appropriate religious accommodations, 
although it recognized the limitations of the political process. Prisons are not run 
on democratic principles, however, and prisoners have no political control. 
Thus, reliance on prison administrators to provide appropriate religious 
accommodations may be misplaced.” (citations omitted)). 
 161. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 162. See McConnell, supra note 58, at 153. 
 163. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
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V. THE POLITICAL PROTECTION OF PRISONER FREE-EXERCISE 
RIGHTS 
For better or worse, Smith eliminated nearly all judicial review 
of free-exercise claims and left free-exercise protection in the 
hands of the democratic process.164 Since Smith, free-exercise 
rights are only protected insofar as society is willing to protect 
them.165 In other words, if a society believes that free-exercise 
rights of a certain kind should be protected, then its laws will 
reflect that belief.166 Prisoners should not be immune from this 
rationale.  
As with nonprisoners’ rights, the protection of prisoners’ free-
exercise rights should depend not on the courts but rather on the 
political process. Like any religious minorities who lack political 
clout, prisoners may be disadvantaged under a system that 
relegates nearly all free-exercise protections to the legislative 
process. But, according to the reasoning of Smith, such an 
“unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be 
preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself 
. . . .”167 The simple fact of incarceration should not insulate a 
prisoner from the “unavoidable” democratic risks that he shares 
with nonprisoners who are likewise politically disadvantaged. 
Ultimately, however, a prisoner’s lack of political power is 
unlikely to diminish the amount of political protection that his free-
exercise rights receive.  
A. RLUIPA and the Added Protections of Prisoner Free-Exercise 
Rights 
The political process has not neglected prisoners’ free-exercise 
rights. Even under the Smith regime, prisoners have proven quite 
capable of influencing the legislative agenda and gaining adequate 
political protection for their free-exercise rights. For instance, in 
2000, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which restored strict 
                                                                                                             
 164. See McConnell, supra note 58, at 153 (“Under [Smith], ‘neutral, 
generally applicable law[s]’ are categorically exempt from constitutional 
scrutiny, even when they prohibit or substantially burden religious exercise.” 
(quoting Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 881 (1990))); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
 165. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 490. 
 166. See id. 
 167. Id. 
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scrutiny to prisoner free-exercise claims.168 The legislative history 
of RLUIPA provides proof of Congress’ commitment to protect 
prisoner free-exercise rights.169 Furthermore, RLUIPA’s legislative 
history shows the powerful effect that interest groups—working on 
behalf of prisoners—had on the statute’s passage.170  
Soon after Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA), which sought to restore Sherbert’s 
“compelling interest” test as the standard of review for all free-
exercise claims, including prisoner claims.171 RFRA was 
enormously popular in Congress.172 However, in the 1997 case 
City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court held RFRA unconstitutional as 
applied to the states.173 Following the City of Boerne decision, the 
House Subcommittee on the Constitution held three separate 
hearings in which a number of interest groups presented testimony 
advocating for new legislation to protect prisoners’ free-exercise 
rights.174 The House Subcommittee heard testimony from Catholic, 
Christian, Jewish, Mormon, and Muslim organizations.175 In 
particular, the Subcommittee heard accounts of the severe burdens 
prison administrators that had placed on religious inmates.176 
                                                                                                             
 168. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2006). More specifically, RLUIPA restored 
the “compelling governmental interest” test to claims of prisoners that represent 
a “substantial burden” on a prisoner’s religious free exercise. See id.  
 169. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 170. See discussion infra Part V.A. These interest groups testified before 
Congress and lobbied legislators in an effort to drum up support for the statute. 
Their efforts paid off, and RLUIPA was a resounding success.  
 171. Matthew D. Kreuger, Respecting Religious Liberty: Why RLUIPA Does 
Not Violate the Establishment Clause, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1179, 1185 (2008). 
 172. See McConnell, supra note 58, at 160 (“After due consideration, the 
House of Representatives passed RFRA unanimously and the Senate did so by a 
vote of 97–3.”).  
 173. See 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Kreuger, supra note 171, at 1186. 
 174. See generally Protecting Religious Freedom after Boerne v. Flores: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997); Protecting Religious Freedom after Boerne v. 
Flores (Part II): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998); Protecting Religious Freedom 
after Boerne v. Flores (Part III): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998).  
 175. See Protecting Religious Freedom after Boerne v. Flores: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
105th Cong. 4–5 (1997); Protecting Religious Freedom after Boerne v. Flores 
(Part II): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 4–6 (1998); Protecting Religious Freedom after 
Boerne v. Flores (Part III): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 5–6 (1998).  
 176. See Kreuger, supra note 171, at 1186–87. 
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Inspired by this testimony, Senators Orrin Hatch and Ted Kennedy 
drafted the Senate version of RLUIPA.177  
To ensure RLUIPA’s passage, Congress limited the bill’s 
scope to two areas of concern: land use restrictions and 
institutional regulations.178 The testimony before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and the House Subcommittee on the 
Constitution convinced RLUIPA’s redactors that these two areas 
were particularly susceptible to free-exercise burdens and were 
therefore especially deserving of increased political protection.179 
With regard to institutional regulations, RLUIPA reads: 
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the 
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an 
institution, [which includes any “jail, prison, or other 
correctional facility,”]180 even if the burden results from a 
rule of general applicability, unless the government 
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that 
person— 
 (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
interest; and 
 (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest.181 
                                                                                                             
 177. 146 Cong. Rec. 14,284 (2000) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).  
 178. Compare Kreuger, supra note 171, at 1186 (“Fearing that such an 
expansive provision would suffer the same fate as RFRA, Congress limited 
RLUIPA to two areas in which it heard significant testimony documenting 
religious discrimination: land use and institutions such as prisons.”), with 
Keegan, supra note 6, at 304–05 (“It is likely that the Senate version was limited 
in scope in order to allay the fears of those people and organizations who 
believed that an act of sweeping applicability would have adverse effects on 
other civil rights laws.”). 
 179. See 146 Cong. Rec. 16,698 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and 
Kennedy).  
 180. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997(1)(B)(ii) (2006) (defining “institution”). 
 181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2006). This language effectively restores a strict 
scrutiny analysis to prisoner free-exercise claims. There is, however, room for 
debate that RLUIPA may in fact be a deferential form of strict scrutiny. See 
SARAH E. RICKS & EVELYN M. TENENBAUM, CURRENT ISSUES IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE CASEBOOK 641 
(2011). This debate exists in large part due to the Supreme Court’s description 
of RLUIPA in Cutter v. Wilkinson. In Cutter, the Supreme Court noted: 
“Lawmakers supporting RLUIPA were mindful of the urgency of discipline, 
order, safety, and security in penal institutions and anticipated that courts would 
apply the Act’s standard with due deference to prison administrators’ experience 
and expertise.” 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005) (quoting 146 Cong. Rec. 16,699 
(2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy)). But regardless of this 
deferential language in Senators Hatch and Kennedy’s joint statement, 
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Senators Hatch and Kennedy championed RLUIPA vigorously on 
the Senate floor.182 Eventually, over 50 diverse and well-respected 
interest groups supported the Senate version of the bill.183 
RLUIPA’s popularity among senators was equally overwhelming. 
The bill received bipartisan support and was passed unanimously 
in the Senate without objection.184  
RLUIPA’s legislative journey proves that the democratic 
process is equally capable of protecting prisoners’ and 
nonprisoners’ free-exercise rights. Congress passed RLUIPA just 
as it would any other law. Committed lobbyists and concerned 
legislators banded together and convinced Congress to support 
them.185 The only difference between RLUIPA and most other 
laws is the amount of bipartisan support it received.186 While it 
may seem as if RLUIPA should have solved the Smith–Turner 
debate, in actuality, it has not. The conflict between Smith and 
Turner still exists, and the resolution of the conflict remains a 
worthwhile endeavor.  
B. The Lasting Effects of Turner’s Continued Application 
From the standpoint of a casual observer, it would seem 
redundant for a prisoner to assert a free-exercise claim under the 
Constitution if he could find similar relief under RLUIPA.187 
Despite RLUIPA, prisoners still possess a cause of action under 
                                                                                                             
 
RLUIPA’s plain language shows that the standard is clearly more restrictive on 
the state than Smith or Turner.  
 182. See 146 Cong. Rec. 14,283–84 (2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 146 
Cong. Rec. 14,284–86 (2000) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); 146 Cong. Rec. 
16,698–700 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy).  
 183. 146 Cong. Rec. 16,701 (2000) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). These 
groups included: the Christian Legal Society, American Civil Liberties Union, 
People for the American Way, and the Leadership Conference for Civil Rights. 
Id.  
 184. 146 Cong. Rec. 16,703 (2000) (statement of Sen. Reid) (illustrating the 
bipartisan support RLUIPA received and showing RLUIPA’s unanimous 
passage). 
 185. See Interest Groups, USHISTORY.ORG, http://www.ushistory.org/gov/ 
5c.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (explaining how interest groups operate in 
America). 
 186. Partisanship: America's Second Civil War?, NPR.ORG (Nov. 16, 2007), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16349093 (noting that the 
level of party-line voting in Congress is at its highest level in over a century). 
 187. Under RLUIPA and Turner, victorious prisoners are entitled to 
injunctive relief and attorney’s fees. While Turner offers the potential for 
monetary awards, these awards are limited to nominal awards due to the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).  
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Turner.188 Therefore, a great number of prisoners bringing free-
exercise claims continue to seek relief under Turner.189 While the 
exact motivations for filing a First Amendment Turner claim in 
tandem with an RLUIPA claim are uncertain, the practical effects 
of Turner’s continued application are significant.  
One possible motivation for filing a free-exercise claim is the 
prospect of monetary damages. Turner allows prisoners to recover 
monetary damages, while RLUIPA generally does not.190 
However, judges rarely award monetary relief for prisoners’ First 
Amendment free-exercise claims.191 In order to receive a monetary 
award under Turner, a prisoner must show that the alleged 
violation of his First Amendment rights resulted in a physical 
injury—a highly unlikely scenario.192 Therefore, prisoners 
probably have a separate motivation for filing a First Amendment 
Turner claim in tandem with an RLUIPA claim.  
More likely than not, prisoners continue to argue Turner in 
free-exercise cases simply out of adherence—albeit a misguided 
adherence—to precedent. Despite RLUIPA, Turner remains the 
analytical starting-point upon which courts generally begin their 
analyses in prisoner free-exercise cases.193 Even though the strict 
scrutiny of RLUIPA is more stringent than Turner’s 
“reasonableness” standard, courts will still expend great energy 
                                                                                                             
 188. See RICKS & TENENBAUM, supra note 181, at 642 (noting that many 
RLUIPA claims are brought in tandem with a First Amendment claim). 
 189. In January 2012 alone, the federal court system addressed at least six 
cases involving dual Turner–RLUIPA claims. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Walker, No. 
09-cv-0457-MJR-SCW, 2012 WL 253442, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2012) (raising 
an RLUIPA claim and a Turner claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Monts v. 
Arpaio, No. CV 10-0532-PHX-FJM (ECV), 2012 WL 160246, at *1 (D. Ariz. 
Jan. 19, 2012) (same); Bland v. Aviles, No. 11-1742 (ES), 2012 WL 137783, at 
*6 n.3 (D.N.J. Jan. 18, 2012) (addressing both RLUIPA and Turner standards 
but failing to decide the free-exercise issue and instead allowing plaintiff leave 
to amend pleading).  
 190. States do not waive their sovereign immunity to private suits seeking 
monetary damages under RLUIPA. Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1663 
(2011). Whether a plaintiff can recover monetary damages from state officials 
sued in their private capacity is less settled. See Fields v. Voss, No. 1:07-cv-
00595-AWI-GSA (PC), 2010 WL 476040, at *3–5 (E.D. Calif. Feb. 4, 2010) 
(explaining the varying schools of thought as to whether prison officials can be 
sued in their individual capacities under RLUIPA).  
 191. See, e.g., Leonard v. Louisiana, No. 07-0813, 2010 WL 3780793, at *1–
2 (W.D. La. Sept 20, 2010) (“Nominal damages are the proper award for a 
constitutional violation unaccompanied by a compensable injury or damage.”). 
 192. The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) 
(2003), states: “No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in 
a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury 
suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” 
 193. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 189. 
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analyzing alleged free-exercise violations under Turner’s four-part 
balancing test before deferring to RLUIPA.194 Therefore, prisoners, 
often litigating in a pro se capacity, will mirror prior courts’ 
analytical patterns and claim relief under Turner even when doing 
so is futile or unnecessarily duplicative in light of RLUIPA.195 Yet 
these dual Turner–RLUIPA claims are not confined to the 
pleadings of inexperienced prisoner litigants. Well-trained counsel, 
representing prisoners on a pro bono basis, often file claims 
seeking relief on both constitutional and statutory grounds.196 This 
continued application of Turner can have a substantial effect on 
state resources.  
In a large number of prisoner free-exercise cases, the state must 
prepare for and defend against a Turner claim that should—for all 
intents and purposes—no longer exist. In effect, Turner needlessly 
increases the state’s litigation expenses. Whereas in nonprisoner 
cases the state can defeat most constitutional free-exercise claims 
by asserting the Smith neutrality principle, the state’s burden is 
much more onerous when Turner is raised in a prisoner free-
exercise case. To successfully defend against a Turner claim, the 
state must spend time researching the issue and applying the 
relevant facts of the case to the Turner balancing test.197 While a 
single Turner claim may not place an undue hardship on a state’s 
defense team, all Turner claims—in the aggregate—can account 
for considerable litigation costs.198 Ultimately, the taxpayers, who 
                                                                                                             
 194. See, e.g., Cotton v. Cate, No. C 09-0385 WHA (PR), 2011 WL 3877074 
(W.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2011). 
 195. Many prisoner free-exercise cases are brought by pro se prisoner 
litigants. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Walker, No. 09-cv-0457-MJR-SCW, 2012 WL 
253442 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2012); Monts v. Arpaio, No. CV 10-0532-PHX-FJM 
(ECV), 2012 WL 160246 (D. Ariz. Jan. 19, 2012); Bland v. Aviles, No. 11-1742 
(ES), 2012 WL 137783 (D.N.J. Jan. 18, 2012). 
 196. See, e.g., Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144 (3rd Cir. 2012) (listing private 
counsel for plaintiff in a case presenting a tandem Turner–RLUIPA claim); 
Leonard v. Louisiana, No. 07-0813, 2010 WL 1285447 (W.D. La. Mar. 31, 
2010) (same).  
 197. Because the state is not awarded attorney’s fees for successfully 
defending against a Turner or RLUIPA claim, state attorneys need not submit 
billing records to the court. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain the exact 
amount of time or money spent by the state in defending any one particular 
Turner claim. But assuming that any competent state counsel must adequately 
defend against a Turner claim or face a default judgment against the state, a 
state attorney must, at a minimum, expend the necessary effort to research and 
brief the issue. Both of these activities require time and money.  
 198. While it is difficult to place an exact monetary value on the cost of 
defending Turner claims, each claim comes at some cost to the state. And 
considering that tandem Turner–RLUIPA claims are continuously raised in 
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finance the state’s attorneys, bear the financial burden of Turner’s 
unnecessary application. But even assuming that RLUIPA has 
nullified many of the practical ramifications of the Smith–Turner 
paradox, RLUIPA has not addressed the fundamental conflict 
between the Smith and Turner standards.  
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of constitutional interpretation, resolution of the 
Smith–Turner debate is critical. The First Amendment has been, 
and will continue to be, the basis of religious protection in 
America.199 With the Constitution being of such signal importance, 
any blatant inconsistency in the interpretation of its core provisions 
creates a crack in the bedrock of American law. And Turner is a 
blatant inconsistency.  
Regardless of RLUIPA’s mitigating effects, Turner’s 
continued application in free-exercise cases is patently illogical. 
The Court never intended Turner to place free-exercise claims of 
prisoners at a distinct advantage over similar claims by private 
citizens.200 In fact, the Court has consistently held that 
incarceration limits prisoner rights.201 Only in exceptional cases 
has the Court held that prisoners’ constitutional rights should be 
evaluated under the same standard as nonprisoners’ rights, and the 
Court has never held that prisoners should receive more 
constitutional protection than nonprisoners.202 Under Turner, 
however, prisoners’ free-exercise rights do receive more 
constitutional protection than those of noninmates. This result is 
not only unprecedented, but also unsettling, considering the 
Court’s recognized need for judicial restraint in prisoner free-
exercise cases.203  
This Comment has not argued that prisoners’ free-exercise 
rights should remain unprotected. Rather, this Comment only holds 
that prisoners’ free-exercise rights should not receive more 
constitutional protection than those of private citizens. Smith 
relegated protection of noninmates’ free-exercise rights to the 
democratic process, and the same should be done for inmates’ free-
                                                                                                             
 
federal courts throughout the country, it is logical to assume that the combined 
effect of these claims on state resources is significant.  
 199. In nearly every prisoner and nonprisoner case, the First Amendment’s 
Free Exercise Clause is cited as the starting point of legal analysis.  
 200. See discussion supra Part III. 
 201. See discussion supra Part III. 
 202. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 203. See discussion supra Part III. 
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exercise rights. The popularity of RLUIPA proves that the political 
process is equally capable of protecting prisoners’ and 
nonprisoners’ free-exercise rights alike, and therefore, Turner’s 
added protections are entirely unnecessary. Turner only serves to 
perpetuate a constitutional anomaly and burdens the states with 
defending against a cause of action that should no longer exist.  
 
Joseph Thomas Wilson* 
  
                                                                                                             
 * J.D./D.C.L., 2013, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. 
Recipient of the 2011–2012 Vinson & Elkins Best Casenote or Comment Award 
for Excellence in Legal Writing.   
The author would like to thank Professor John Devlin and Ryan French for their 
guidance throughout the writing of this piece.   
